The first meeting of the Council of Regions between Russia and Uzbekistan was marked by a historic milestone for the Central Asian energy landscape. The chairs of the council, namely Presidents Vladimir Putin and Shavkat Mirziyoyev, agreed on the construction of six mini nuclear power plants, of 55MW each, in the region of Jizzakh. This is a historic moment from several aspects, as it is the first effort to construct small-scale nuclear units. Moreover, if successful, they will be the first nuclear power plants in a region such as Central Asia, that faces serious energy security issues, despite the abundance of energy resources. Finally, it is the first coordinated effort of regional paradiplomacy on behalf of Moscow. Based on the aforementioned, several questions arise regarding the potential of Kremlin to reclaim its leading role in the energy sector of Central Asia through nuclear energy and paradiplomacy, but also regarding the potential of nuclear energy to unify Central Asian states for regional energy collaboration or further divide, taking into account the global debate over nuclear power. The first question that will be answered in this series of articles will be about the technical potential of nuclear power in Central Asia and the potential of Russia to win in the energy technology chessboard.
The Potential for Nuclear in Central Asia
Central Asia is a region that is endowed with vast resources related to the energy sector and nuclear energy is no exception to this rule. As of 2021, Kazakhstan was the second richest country in Uranium reserves, which is the prevalent fuel needed for nuclear energy production globally, comprising 13% of the global reserves, or 815,000 tonnes. Uzbekistan ranks lower, albeit with also considerable amount of Uranium, having 2% of the global reserves, or 135,000 tonnes. The region is also well-positioned to support alternative nuclear technologies and fuels. Currently, the prevalent technology involves the use of Thorium, and Kazakhstan possesses at least 50,000 tonnes of the fuel, with Uzbekistan possessing 5,000 tonnes and the rest of the CIS states combined having more than 1mn tonnes. The exact figures cannot be known yet, as the exploration of Thorium is in an initial stage. To give a perspective on these amounts, one tonne of Uranium can produce as much as 44mn kWh, whilst one tonne of Thorium can produce as much energy as 200 tonnes of Uranium. It can be understood that nuclear energy can have huge potential to reshape the energy security landscape for Central Asia, not solely Uzbekistan.
The Role of Russia and Nuclear Energy Diplomacy
The Success of Rosatom
Reflecting on the potential of nuclear energy in Central Asia, Russia could have the perfect opportunity to emerge as an energy security guarantor in a region that needs it the most. Rosatom, the nuclear energy agency of Russia, has already made nuclear energy agreements and developed power plants in numerous countries in the Global South. Examples include the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Turkiye and the under construction El Dabaa power plant in Egypt. The benefit that these countries see is the reliability and low-cost of the VVER reactors of Russia, combined with the integrated services that Rosatom offers, from Uranium procurement and enrichment to staff training. Looking into these aspects, it can be derived that Moscow can find a sector to successfully re-emerge as a key partner in Central Asia, starting from one of the largest economies, namely Uzbekistan.
Limitations
There are, nonetheless, important aspects to take into account. Conventional nuclear technologies are excessively water intensive and require approximately 2.500 litres of water for every MWh produced. Central Asia is among the regions with the highest water stress and, unlike Egypt and Turkiye, who use the Mediterranean Sea as a cooling source, the power plants in Jizzakh and other regions in Uzbekistan and Central Asia will not have that luxury. This severely limits the potential of conventional nuclear power plants in the region and, taking into account that the research and innovation capacity of Rosatom has proven to be low over the past decade, any new unit would exacerbate water stress and possibly cause socio-political backlash, in addition to the already existing discussion about sanctions.
This is where China has the major advantage. The main technological advance in the nuclear sector so far has been the “Thorium Revolution” and the emergence of Molten Sand Reactors (MSR). MSRs use molten sand as a cooling aid and, hence, do not require water. They can also use Thorium, which is far more abundant on earth than Uranium, can produce more fissile material and, thus, more energy, but also has fewer long-lived minor actinides than Plutonium fuels (such as Uranium). This is especially important to spur societal acceptance, as issues with local communities mostly focused on nuclear waste and their impact on locations close to dumping sites, with Kyrgyzstan being the prevalent example.
China has emerged as the Thorium technology champion and it has already developed prototypes that power thousands of homes, such as the Wuwei prototype of 10MW, which is expected to be expanded to 100MW and power more than 100,000 homes by the end of the decade. Rosatom has not been as successful, as research on MSRs only began in 2020 and the first prototype is expected to be ready after 2031. Considering this, China is perfectly positioned to provide a technology that is ideally suited to cater to the needs of all Central Asian partners. China has already explored nuclear cooperation with Kazakhstan, allegedly considering a $12bn investment on a 2.4GW power plant, however this project did not move forward under unknown circumstances. It presents, thus, great interest to see and how Beijing will be seeking to export this technology to countries such as Uzbekistan, seeing that they are becoming supportive of nuclear energy.
Conclusion
In effect, the agreement between Russia and Uzbekistan can be seen as a conversation starter for the debate on nuclear energy in Central Asia. Moscow is looking to gain back its position in the energy sector of the region and exercising Rosatom’s nuclear diplomacy on Uzbekistan is a reasonable strategy. Uranium and Thorium reserves are abundant in Central Asia and energy insecurity, especially for Tashkent, is a thorny issue. Nevertheless, the context of land-locked Uzbekistan is different than the previous diplomatic partners of Rosatom, due to technical limitations, and other, already strong, partners of Uzbekistan and Central Asia can resolve these very challenges through research and innovation. Therefore, Moscow’s grip on nuclear energy can be strong in Central Asia, although with many limitations, and it can, instead, open Uzbekistan’s appetite for nuclear energy that, in the absence of water, molten sand (and, hence, China), will be able to quench.
Written by: Dimitris Symeonidis
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