Azerbaijan vs Russia: why a bilateral quarrel is reverberating across Central Asia

The current conflict between Azerbaijan and Russia has three key implications for Central Asian states:

1. Stronger emphasis by Baku on cooperation within the Organization of Turkic States, especially in logistics and digitalization.
2. Russia’s refocus from the Azerbaijani segment of the western branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor toward the route that runs through Central Asian countries and onward to Iran and Afghanistan.
3. The European Union’s push to cement its influence in the South Caucasus to secure a reliable gateway to Central Asia, particularly to the region’s resources, so it can compete more effectively with China.

Although the traditionally close economic ties between Azerbaijan and Russia will drive both sides to seek reconciliation and eventual normalization, the current level of tension will require time to resolve. During that period, significant changes may unfold that will have a direct impact on Central Asian states.

From “model partnership” to open confrontation

Until this summer, Russian analysts often portrayed ties with Azerbaijan as comparatively smooth among post-Soviet relationships. The two countries enjoyed expanding trade, collaborated on security, and generally shared an interest in limiting Western involvement in domestic matters. The atmosphere shifted within a few weeks after two ethnic Azerbaijani brothers died while in police custody in Ekaterinburg. In general, the conflict dates to the tragic crash of an Azal plane on the Baku-Grozny route in the city of Aktau. According to experts, Russia has not apologized in a suitable form.

Azerbaijan’s response included detaining several Russian citizens, inspecting the Sputnik news agency’s office, cancelling upcoming Russian cultural events, and adopting a more critical tone toward Moscow on state television. Three key effects of these events can be noted:

1. Domestic dimension – maintaining national cohesion as the Karabakh issue recedes from the forefront, against a backdrop of heightened external tensions.
2. External signalling – demonstrating to the West and the former Soviet republics that Azerbaijan is not a Russian satellite by actively promoting an independent foreign policy.
3. Bargaining leverage – underscoring that Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus has been undergoing a significant transformation since the 2020 war and the war in Ukraine.

The upshot is a relationship that both capitals insist is “strategic” while treating each other with a level of suspicion unseen since the 1990s. That tension, in turn, is already reshaping economic geography, transit diplomacy and great-power competition far beyond the Caspian — most immediately in Central Asia.

Why geography suddenly matters even more?

In Azerbaijani there is the concept of “Könül Coğrafiyası,”which literally means “geography of the heart” or “map of the soul.” It is a poetic expression that refers to a person’s inner emotional world - feelings, memories, attachments, and the “places” in the heart where cherished people and experiences reside. For Azerbaijan, the countries of Central Asia form part of its Könül coğrafiyası. At this stage, the geographic proximity of Azerbaijan, situated in the South Caucasus, and the Central Asian states creates an opening for the two regions to draw closer and promote Eurasian connectivity.

2.1 A turbo-charged Turkic vector

Some central Asian governments have long considered closer Turkic cooperation in specific areas like trade, transport and digital interconnectivity, and the recent Moscow–Baku dispute has added a clear geopolitical motive for advancing it. Both before and immediately after the crisis, officials in the region reiterated their commitment to projects that rely on Azerbaijan’s west-oriented transit corridors:

Middle Corridor – freight volumes grew by 63% in 2024, reaching 4.1 million tons in the first 11 months and the route aims to handle at least 50,000 standard containers in 2025 as shippers hedge against both Russian territory and Suez chokepoints.

Green Energy Corridor – the July-launched Green Corridor Union plans a 1 GW subsea cable from Kazakhstan’s Aktau wind cluster to Baku and onwards under the Black Sea to Romania and Hungary, linking Central Asian renewables directly to the EU grid by late 2029.

Hydrocarbon swap flows – with the Kremlin distracted, SOCAR and KazMunayGas revived talks on expanding the Aktau–Baku oil shuttle from today’s 1.5 million t/y toward the design capacity of 10 million t/y, while Turkmenistan studies a parallel gas-to-electricity export scheme. During a May 2025 meeting between KazMunayGas Chairman Askhat Khassenovand SOCAR President Rovshan Najaf, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to expanding oil transportation via the Aktau-Baku-Ceyhan route. The sides are also negotiating the launch of Kazakh oil through the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which can carry up to 5 million tons of oil, but to achieve real results Kazakhstan needs to expand its tanker fleet to carry oil across the Caspian.

Politically, all three rely on the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which Aliyev calls “our first family”. For some Central Asian presidents, the OTS offers a safe multilateral cover for deeper cooperation with Baku (and, by extension, Ankara) that does not immediately provoke Moscow in the way NATO or EU initiatives would.

2.2 North–South Corridor: the eastern pivot

The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) was conceived as three legs converging on the Persian Gulf. The western branch, which spans from Azerbaijan to Iran’s port of Astara, is the most direct route. However, it is now subject to political risk due to the absence of red lines between Iran and Israel, meaning that mutual strikes could occur at any time.Russian rail operators are quietly shifting loads to the eastern branch (Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran), whose share of all INSTC container traffic rose from 67 % in 2022 to 78 % in 2024.

For Central Asia this has two implications:

Hard-infrastructure windfall. Tehran and Moscow have ample motive to co-finance upgrades on Kazakh and Turkmen tracks, as well as the Turkmenbashi–Baku ro-ro link, to ensure redundancy. Kazakhstan already counts the route as part of its “Dry Port to Indian Ocean” blueprint; Ashgabat sees it as leverage to unlock gas exports via Iran’s pipeline grid.

Return of the Afghan option. With the western leg wobbling, Russia and Uzbekistan have revived the Trans-Afghan railwayfrom Termez to Pakistan’s Karachi and Gwadar ports. If (and it remains a big “if”) security guarantees hold, Uzbek and Kazakh exporters could shave ten days off deliveries to South Asia and the Gulf, diversifying trade routes in addition to existing ones.

Eastern routes include transit through territory of Central Asian states.

In other words, every kilometer that detours around Azerbaijan pushes new investment and strategic attention into Central Asian territory.

2.3 Brussels looks east, via the Caucasus

The European Union views the escalating tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia as both a concerning development and a strategic opportunity to expand its influence in the South Caucasus region. Three vectors stand out:

Condemnation of Russian Actions. The EU has directly criticized Russia's treatment of ethnic Azerbaijanis, with EU Ambassador to Azerbaijan Peter Michalko condemning reportsof "violence, torture and inhuman treatment against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia, leading even to deaths, committed by Russian security forces".

Connectivity cash. Analysis suggests that strengthening cooperation with both Armenia and Azerbaijan could "provide the EU with secure access to the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and China" through alternative transport routes. Since 2022 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has approved over €350 million in transport loans for the South Caucasus.

Soft-power surge. Human-rights language once reserved for Baku has been toned down in favor of energy security messaging, while EU de-mining and carbon-border-adjustment programmes now explicitly bundle Azerbaijan with Central Asian “frontline partners”.

Central Asia benefits twice: first as an indispensable segment of any Caucasus-to-China land bridge, and second as the swing region in Brussels’ broader contest with Beijing. The more uncertain Russia’s standing in Baku appears, the stronger the EU argument for treating Central Asia as direct rather than peripheral partners.

Conclusion: Central Asia’s corridor moment

The Azerbaijan–Russia conflict may yet cool down, since both sides need each other economically, the psychological threshold has been crossed. For Central Asian states the lesson is clear: diversification equals resilience. Whether via increased cooperation with South Caucasus states, alternative INSTC alignments or accelerated EU engagement, the region is busy converting another geopolitical shock into concrete infrastructure and diplomatic agency.

In the process Central Asia is no longer a distant observer of Caucasian affairs; it is an active stakeholder whose rail tracks, energy cables and foreign-policy choices will help assert status of subjects instead of object of international affairs.

By Eldaniz Gusseinov,

Daryo columnist

Follow Daryo's official Instagram and Twitter pages to keep current on world news.