Time for Washington to revisit its response to BRI strategy

The Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts have highlighted how diplomacy has taken a backseat to military action in the U.S.’s arsenal of foreign policy measures. While conflict escalation might not be the U.S.’s intention, Washington consistently fails to explore other options for resolving global issues. The same theme repeats itself in arenas besides military conflict.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy brainchild, aimed at investing in and loaning money to developing countries to build critical infrastructure such as railways and ports. It has cemented China as a rising global power and furthered the trend towards multipolarity, with the U.S. in relative decline.

Xi first introduced the BRI in 2013, shortly after President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia”, and since then, its rising popularity has caused more worry for U.S. officials. While the Obama administration never publicly acknowledged the BRI and continued its attempts to prevent China’s rise, Trump applied heavy diplomatic pressure to BRI recipients and attempted to invest $113 million in infrastructure building. Now, President Biden, along with the rest of the G-7, has launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII) to work towards the same ends as the BRI, with partially different means.

The BRI is wavering due to criticisms of “debt trapping”, corruption, and harmful environmental standards. Xi’s announcement of reforms at the 2023 BRI Forum in Beijing to address parts of these issues by promoting smaller, greener, and more commercially led projects presents a critical juncture of opportunity for the U.S. to flex its capabilities where Beijing is lacking.

The Case for State-level Diplomacy

The PGII has many barriers to overcome to be a viable alternative to the BRI. However, competition can push both to better meet the needs of recipient countries who are more interested in sustainable debt levels, respect for environmental and human rights standards, and projects that will last without needing large-scale maintenance.

Despite originating from seemingly opposing geopolitical actors, the PGII and BRI share many similarities: goals, means, and targeted countries. Due to these convergences, there is potential for cooperation. The two must use the experiences they have acquired, while indirectly competing for project deals – to the benefit of recipient countries – to collaborate.

Cooperation should begin through diplomatic engagement with China. The U.S. must engage in common good diplomacy and acknowledge that, in this specific area, China can be a partner. China has publicly announced its willingness to work with other global infrastructure initiatives, such as Europe’s Global Gateway, a key part of the PGII. While the U.S. is likely to remain hawkish towards China’s intentions in the near future, the U.S. can meet Beijing halfway in global development.

President Biden and President Xi recently met on the sidelines of the 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, marking the first meeting between US and Chinese leaders in years and showing the two currently seek to improve ties. They found a few areas of agreement: military communication and fentanyl reduction. Global infrastructure could be the next area for incremental partnership, providing a small-scale trial run for collaboration. It would present an opportunity to showcase good intentions.

Meetings on infrastructure cooperation could take place on the side of the next G77 conferences or the 2024 UN climate talks. The State Department, which has goals to expand the PGII beyond the G7, could also spearhead coordination.

Cooperation will need to start small, beginning with private talks between select officials on their plans for the PGII and BRI. This could begin by briefing each other on already public information, such as progress and challenges on disclosed projects. Incremental commitments from both sides to collaborate in technical expertise and infrastructural resources can increase mutual trust. They could exchange ideas, advice, and constructive criticism, such as recommending BRI projects to use fewer Chinese workers to increase local employment in recipient countries.

These meetings can be a forum for coordination. One possible area is in the types of infrastructure the two sides specialize in. China has much more experience in “hard” projects such as ports and railways, while the West has more experience with “soft” projects like education and healthcare, in which China is seeking more involvement.

Forums can include different sessions for thematic issues, such as green infrastructure. The U.S. and China have already cooperated on global issues like climate change, and aim to bolster climate ties in the coming months. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) provides a compelling starting point for green infrastructure. The PGII-BRI meetings should host DRC representatives to discuss needs and first steps. Involving China in G-7 training and advising teams on environmental, financial, and engineering concerns can serve as another area for growth between PGII and BRI officials.

To yield larger results, the U.S. can enhance WTO and IMF cooperation with Chinese-led multilateral financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Asian Development Bank. While the two Western-centric and U.S.-led international institutions are unlikely to reform their major shortcomings to become more effective and attractive for the developing world, they have financial resources that can contribute to these projects.

Bottom-up Diplomatic Tools for the U.S.

Beyond the level of state relations, the U.S. should mobilize bottom-up diplomatic initiatives to sustainably compete with China’s BRI. With most of the criticism facing the BRI centers on issues of corruption, debt management, and sustainability, the U.S. has avenues to fill in where Beijing is lacking.

The BRI’s Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, for example, came under scrutiny for “debt-trap” allegations. Contrary to these allegations, the project was persistently pushed by former president Mahinda Rajapaksa due to his personal and political interests in developing his home district despite concerns over commercial viability. In such cases, public information campaigns can help increase public awareness of the risks of BRI projects in respective localities to offer a democratic check to their implementation. The U.S. can replicate its Radio Free model in these jurisdictions to enable local populations to make informed decisions and democratically oppose economically irresponsible and corrupt projects.

To further augment this, the U.S. government can facilitate the export of its professional services industry to these developing markets and take the lead in building capacities for debt management, accounting, and feasibility studies. As a geo-economic strategy, the U.S. would be able to complement weaknesses in China’s BRI without matching it dollar-for-dollar. While China has signaled its pivot to a commercially-led, smaller-fund, and more ‘green’ approach, the U.S. can leverage its influence in multilateral standard-setting institutions to spearhead anti-corruption efforts in BRI deals. The Inflation Reduction Act's (IRA) creation of a conducive ecosystem gives Washington the credibility to offer both knowledge-sharing and capacity-building in low-carbon infrastructure.

With Washington’s criticism of the BRI’s quality assurance and debt management, the U.S. must put its money where its mouth is by 1) demonstrably committing to higher quality standards and tangible results for PGII projects and 2) offering better alternatives to project financing without the condition of democratic reform. Developing countries are already opting for BRI projects due to their pragmatic objective of infrastructure development, as compared to the West’s funding of public administration, where results are harder to assure. A continued harping on democracy promotion, combined with a disgruntled Global South with the West’s interventionist foreign policies, will not bode well for American global leadership.

A revamped development diplomacy strategy in Washington must also come in the context of a paradigm shift in the American approach toward the trend of multipolarity. It is already evident that decoupling from China is a knee-jerk reaction causing the U.S. more harm than good. Anti-Chinese rhetoric and decoupling strategies ought to be eased in favor of cooperation initiatives along with a re-commitment to tangible development in the Global South. Strategic cooperation, especially in the areas of education and manufacturing, is beneficial to the American economy and also to Washington’s credibility in leading global development. If the U.S. wants to reclaim its international legitimacy, it must learn to co-exist and collaborate with other rising powers, without unilaterally enforcing its agenda, and instead working towards win-win goals lest Washington fulfills the Thucydides’ Trap.

Authors:

Dylan Morgan is a graduate of the University of Iowa, received a Bachelors in International Relations and Political Science, and is a student of the School for International Training (SIT): International Studies and Multilateral Diplomacy. Research experience on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asia, and the Tajik Civil War. Clerk at the State of Iowa Senate and Campaign Manager for Senator Erick Giddens.  dylan-morgan@uiowa.edu 

Bryan Soh is an undergraduate studying International Relations at Claremont McKenna College, with a focus in U.S.-China relations and environmental policymaking. He has previously worked in the National Climate Change Secretariat in Singapore, and was a Keck Center Research Fellow for the Study of Race in International Relations.  bsoh25@cmc.edu