Sophie Ibbotson, the Chairman of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs and a consultant on economic development and water conflict in Central Asia and Afghanistan, anticipates that the Taliban will soon receive diplomatic recognition as the official government of Afghanistan. This recognition will lead to the reopening of embassies and consulates, the lifting of sanctions, the initiation of trade deals, and the return of many international organizations.
The international community’s consistent message in 2021, that recognition would be contingent on an inclusive government and a commitment to human rights, will likely be discreetly set aside. The collective rhetoric, although possibly well-intentioned, failed to exert the desired influence on the Taliban. Key international players often prioritize short-term economic and political self-interest over ideology and ethics.
Ibbotson clarifies that she is not advocating for the recognition of the Taliban. Instead, she believes the process is already in motion and aims to highlight the indicators and explain them. The collapse of the Afghan Government and the Taliban’s takeover in the summer of 2021 took many well-informed individuals by surprise. The diplomatic recognition of the Taliban should not be as shocking.
As of January 2024, over 20 countries have already established de facto diplomatic ties with the Taliban at various levels. While the actions of countries like Belarus and Venezuela might be seen as performative allyship, there are also some critical and, in some cases, unexpected regional players on the list. Taliban diplomats have been accredited and are operating at embassies and consulates in neighbouring countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan.
Russia’s Foreign Ministry accredited the Taliban’s charge d’affaires in Moscow, and in December 2023, China formally accepted the Taliban’s ambassador to Beijing, becoming the first country to do so. Despite closing the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi, India acknowledges that the Afghan consulates in Hyderabad and Mumbai maintain relations with the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry. India reopened its embassy in Kabul in 2022, joining China, Japan, Qatar, Russia, and a dozen other states.
Multilateral organizations have started to remove some of the legal obstacles that could hinder future recognition of the Taliban. The United Nations Security Council no longer labels the Taliban as a terrorist organization and has removed it from the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List. Countries including Australia and Kazakhstan have followed suit, removing the Taliban from their lists of proscribed organizations.
Interestingly, despite its diplomatic ties, Russia still labels the Taliban as a terrorist group. Nikola Mikovic, writing in the Diplomatic Courier, suggests that this could be used as a bargaining chip, a “goodwill gesture” offered in exchange for the Taliban’s recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and other Ukrainian territories.
In the media and policy discourse, the call for diplomatic recognition of the Taliban is growing. Both Foreign Policy and The New York Times have published persuasive opinion pieces in its favour, presenting a variety of arguments. The voices lobbying for recognition have diverse agendas, some prioritizing the needs of Afghans, while others are driven by self-interest.
According to the World Bank, in 2023, Afghanistan was grappling with acute food insecurity, affecting 40% of its population. The country’s real sector had been in a state of contraction for two consecutive years. The prospects for economic recovery remain bleak unless sanctions are lifted and international banks become less hesitant to process financial transactions.
Kathy Gannon, in an article in The New York Times, suggests that the absence of an international presence in Kabul allowed Taliban hardliners to consolidate their control. However, theoretically, a return of diplomatic engagement could strengthen those advocating for international engagement and those with a more liberal worldview, albeit relatively.
The primary motivation for recognizing the Taliban is not necessarily the welfare of the Afghan people. In an ideal scenario, it would be a beneficial byproduct. Veena Ramachandran and Amit Kumar, writing in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, outline China’s priorities clearly:
- Neutralizing perceived threats from Uighur militants;
- Exploiting Afghanistan’s untapped mineral wealth;
- Expanding the market for Chinese goods.
Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan also have a vested interest in normalizing diplomatic relations to facilitate regional trade and implement joint projects such as the TAPI pipeline and the Trans-Afghan Railway. This would also simplify the process of reaching trans-boundary water sharing agreements, thereby reducing the risks posed by projects like the Qosh Tepa Canal.
If one were to speculate which major player would be the first to grant the Taliban full diplomatic recognition, it would likely be China. Such a move would challenge the US to follow suit. The US is already represented in Kabul through its proxy, Qatar, but this arrangement offers far less influence than a fully-fledged diplomatic relationship. The US would not want Afghanistan to fall entirely within China’s sphere of influence, especially when mining rights and infrastructure contracts are at stake.
For US banks and businesses to be more than mere observers, there needs to be diplomatic predictability and a lifting of sanctions, thereby reducing the associated financial, legal, and reputational risks. While it is uncertain when the US will take this step, it is likely to trigger a domino effect, with other countries following Washington’s lead.
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