To the majority of analysts studying the foreign policy of Russia over the decades, the Council of Regions between Moscow and Taskhent in May barely comes as a surprise. For more than 20 years this has been observed in virtually all borders of the Russian Federation. Kola Republic, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts have always been in contact with Scandinavian nations over maritime routes, while the Far Eastern Federal District has been involved in trade of critical raw materials with China, among others. However, it is the regions near the Caspian Sea that have seen the highest growth numbers in trade following the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, in particular, have grown closer to Central Asia, especially on a level of political dialogue, but also trade. Considering that, among the deals signed, an agreement for six nuclear reactors of 55MW was made, it presents great interest to see if these small-scale reactors can become part of the regional paradiplomacy in Russia.
A big opportunity
Nuclear diplomacy from Russia is nothing new. Moscow has been engaging with several actors on nuclear energy, providing them both with equipment, such as the reactors themselves, but also with technical expertise and training of personnel via its nuclear energy agency, namely Rosatom. Russia has expanded its outreach to the Global South as, over the past decade, it has engaged in the development of nuclear power plants in Turkiye, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, while it aspires to do the same with Latin America, having approached Argentina in the past. The innovative concept of mini-reactors and small-scale reactors, however, can reshape the nuclear diplomacy landscape for the Kremlin. Small-scale reactors reduce the cost shown at the price tag, with an estimated price for each 55MW reactor of approximately $200-400 million, compared to the billions that large-scale reactors see. Developing such projects can be the outcome of cross-regional cooperation, which brings a new dimension to the Russian policy. However, with regards to Central Asia, the key question is whether the right type of paradiplomacy has been developed to allow for closer cooperation over nuclear energy.
Regional Paradiplomacy in Central Asia
In Central Asia, Russia has been practicing regional paradiplomacy extensively through two main kernels, namely Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The main rationale behind this strategy are the common cultural characteristics in addition to the proximity of these regions. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have been eyeing growth rates of over 3% even after the war on Ukraine begun. By itself this statistic might not be surprising. However, both regions do not have a strong defence sector, which was the main pillar for growth in Russian economy, which shows that they have been successful in other parts of the economy. Examples of engagement include the organization of the International Russia-Islamic World Summit in Kazan at the end of 2022, whereby Central Asian decision-makers participated and President Serdar Berdymukhammedov stressed the importance of collaboration on sectors such as electric mobility and energy in general. While this type of regional paradiplomacy is proving successful to an extent, it does not mean that it will be successful for nuclear diplomacy and some alterations in this strategy will be needed.
Nuclear Regions for Nuclear Diplomacy
The first and most challenging step will be to recalibrate regional paradiplomacy to accommodate nuclear diplomacy. For this step, introduction of regions important for nuclear energy should be made in the discussions. Apart from the Moscow Oblast, the other important regions for nuclear energy in Russia are Novosibirsk Oblast (production of nuclear fuel) and Rostov Oblast (construction of reactors). The former is already a neighboring region to Kazakhstan and has been involved in the Council of Regions, but mostly to increase trade on agricultural machinery, while the latter has been much less involved in dialogue with Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states. Involving them in the process will be a more challenging task from a diplomatic point of view, considering the absence of cultural bonds, however, if successful, can largely benefit Moscow’s strategy for Central Asia.
Distributed Production
The second element is about decentralization. Developing small-scale units and creating centralized infrastructure becomes meaningless. It also overburdens a currently weak electricity grid that Uzbekistan(and the rest of the region) possesses and it makes it vulnerable to power outages. Distributed production through small-scale units across the country, instead of gathering them all in the Jizzakh region might be more costly, but it is more efficient and enhances energy security, while proving to be a great case of regional paradiplomacy and increasing social acceptance. On the other hand, distributed production might be cause technical constraints, as Central Asia is facing serious water shortages and many regions, such as Khorezm and Karakalpakstan might find it challenging to provide cooling in nuclear reactors. A sophisticated policy that will take into account these constraints, but will also encourage the development of other, more water-efficient, technologies will be needed by Uzbekistan and all participating countries in the region.
Conclusion
Overall, regional paradiplomacy and nuclear diplomacy have been policy tools that Moscow has been exercising even before the war in Ukraine began. Combining these two elements, however, brings up numerous opportunities for engagement with Central Asia, but also the Central Asian states can benefit from enhanced energy security, if this strategy is to prove fruitful in the end. However, in order for that to take place, a refining process of Russia’s regional policies, but also a consideration of technical, environmental and economic constraints is paramount, so that this partnership is successful and with, mostly, the energy security of Central Asia as an outcome.
Written by: Dimitris Symeonidis
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